On the idea(1) of logical closure  by Kreisel, G.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 56 (1992) 19-41 
North-Holland 
19 
On the idea(l) of logical closure 
G. Kreisel 
Communicated by A. Nerode 
Received 3 November 1990 
Revised 1 July 1991 
Abstract 
Kreisel, G., On the idea(l) of logical closure, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 56 (1992) 
19-41. 
The article begins and ends with reminiscences and reflections about conversations with Myhill 
(without the conventional separation between personal and logical aspects). The topic in the 
title was never far from these conversations, but remained off stage: questions about the 
suitability of the focus on logical languages and logical consequence, here meant in contrast to 
incomparable categories of propositions and proofs. (This focus is a hallmark of the logical 
tradition.) 
The body of the article goes into cases where this focus has contributed to-and where it 
has distracted from more rewarding categories for- effective knowledge in mathematics. 
There are some rules of thumb for recognizing distractions, and for doing better. 
Introduction 
Many general points, sometimes called insights, are abstractly too simple to be 
memorable, but can have devastating consequences (if forgotten); especially, 
when they are in conflict with venerable traditions. This applies, for example, to 
the point just adumbrated. The topic in the title- incidentally after more than 
100 years of experience with it - serves to focus attention on the following simple 
insight. 
An idea-below, of logical closure-may be logically impeccable, but still 
leave open where and how, if at all, it is an adequate ideal (to pursue). 
Pedantically, there remains the additional question of points of diminishing 
returns in the relentless study of such an idea or, more precisely, of its 
traditionally emphasized aspects. 
The assumption that this additional question is undemanding or even looks 
after itself is implicit in familiar slogans about the ‘unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics’; here, if logical ideas are regarded as mathematical. Much the same 
applies to the slogan of ‘pre-established harmony’, which downplays the 
imagination and other gifts needed to spot and establish such harmony. It should 
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be noted that the assumption applies not only (and obviously) when mathematics 
is thought of as a queen, to be served and/or revered, but also as handmaiden. It 
emphasizes relentless training and discipline of the latter over and above the skills 
of management in selecting rewarding jobs. 
A moment’s thought shows that the present (critical) view of the assumption 
leads to unconventional interpretations of the familiar ‘debates’ about logic; both 
those in the inarticulate style of the silent majority, and those in terms of venerable 
isms, which assume that their privileged categories are suitable for describing the 
facts of experience, here, of logical closure. It would be premature to go into 
detail before those facts are in; cf. the discussion at the end. But there is need, 
even at this stage, for the following: 
Warnings. Do not expect to get something for nothing. If ‘works of labour and 
of skill’ - in Isaac Watts’ (1674-1748) words for so-called Marxist values, here in 
the pursuit of the ideal of logical closure-are not at a premium, there may be 
need for capital, in other words, access to resources. In the commerce of ideas 
this means wider knowledge. As an obvious corollary, the same- wording of 
an - insight, which enriches the understanding of those with the necessary capital 
at their disposal, is liable to leave others with an illusion of understanding. 
A matter of temperament and the present occasion. Traditions and other 
conventions, especially of academic disciplines, have for me an air of total 
unreality unless embodied (as in Virginia Woolf’s famous letter to her sister 
Vanessa about belief in God) in a living person, sitting by the fire, smoking a 
pipe, and ‘believing’ in those conventions; preferably, a (to me) congenial person, 
committed to a so to speak chemically pure specimen of the convention(s) in 
question. Myhill was such a person. What is more, I had occasion to see 
him-smoking a cigarette, and- believing in logical foundations both in the 
forties when we met, albeit briefly, as undergraduates at Cambridge (UK) and 
some 20 years later, when we saw a good deal of each other during my summers 
as visitor at Stanford. It is perhaps - not only self-indulgent, but also - fitting on 
the present occasion if I describe a little some elements of logic at Cambridge at 
that time, which happened to strike me. 
What has been said so far determines the organization of the material below. 
Its presentation, by reference to people and places, should not be (mis)taken as 
involving historical or sociological (cl)aims. Those aspects remain vivid to the 
mind’s eye, and are enough to specify the phenomena involved memorably; to be 
compared to the way we describe material objects by their shape and colour, 
which are vivid to the literal eye, even when their mass or chemical composition 
is as one says scientifically more significant. 
1. Teens at Cambridge 
For quite a time Myhill remained the only person I knew who was convinced 
that logical foundations (of mathematics) were of great significance. At the time 
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his conviction seemed to me odd. His background at school was in the classics, he 
studied for the Moral Sciences Tripos, his mathematical interests seemed to focus 
on a few deductions from set-theoretic axioms, and so there was little chance for 
displaying his mathematical talent (which I probably should not have recognized 
at the time anyway). Today I know better: the less experience people have of 
something, which could contradict their convictions about it, the stronger and 
more sincere those convictions tend to be. 
Through circumstances, which are of no concern here, I saw a good deal of two 
critics of logical foundations: the physicist P.A.M. Dirac (whose stepson was a 
chum) and the philosopher Wittgenstein. Both of them made a strong impression 
on me. As a teenager I could hardly know of their (present) fame. Dirac has 
always been a theoretician’s theoretician, and Wittgenstein became known 
(outside a narrow circle) only after his death. But their personalities had appeal 
for a teenager, too: Dirac’s apparent imperturbability seemed out of this world, 
and everything he said was breathed like a secret from another world. 
Wittgenstein’s talent for agonizing was very special, as was obvious from the 
spectacle of those who tried to imitate it, and so was his gift for- the thrill 
of- indignation. Life was not grey in his company. Their negative convictions 
about logical foundations were firmly rooted in personal experience. 
The geometer Hodge and Dirac were research students together at St. John’s 
(at Cambridge) in the twenties. When Dirac was working towards- what he 
later called - q-numbers, he asked Hodge for literature on the general notion of 
number. Hodge, who told me this story (which I checked with Dirac later) and 
who always had a twinkle in his eye, recommended Principia Mathematics, which 
Dirac went off to study for a fortnight. He was disappointed. At the time my first 
thought was that it would have been a triumph for Principia Mathematics if Dirac 
could have used it for his purpose! But on second thoughts I pointed out to Dirac 
that, if I only knew the kind of logic he knew, I would have an even worse 
opinion of this subject. Since he considered this point pertinent I used it again 
when the occasion arose in conversation with Wittgenstein, who also did not 
consider it impertinent. 
Wittgenstein’s story is public knowledge. Going the whole hog with logical 
foundations (in Tractatus), his (cl)aim was not only, as in Principia, to provide 
for validity of propositions, but to match the (logical) form of their symbolic 
representation with the structure of the thought in question. The inadequacy, for 
this aim, of his foundational scheme could be seen from a mere reminder (by 
Sraffa around 1930). Today I should add that this was even more elementary 
than Godel’s incompleteness argument, which- to repeat what cannot be 
repeated too often- was presented by him as a refutation of Russell’s (or 
Frege’s), not of Hilbert’s programme. Incidentally, the parallel goes further if one 
compares the ways in which, on the one hand, Wittgenstein later thrashed about 
for something to say about the broad area of foundations, and, on the other, 
logicians have filled volumes with logical exercises in (refereed) papers since the 
thirties. 
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The upshot of all this is that I was not ripe for conversations with Myhill at the 
time. I did not even know how simply my malaise at the time about the whole 
matter of foundations could be expressed: whatever, if anything, of interest there 
was to say about that matter, it was not what people actually said about it. 
By temperament I did not feel any ‘urgency of action’, just because that matter 
was traditionally prominent. I simply looked for other things to do with logic. 
Though my supervisor (Besicovitch) was Russian, he did not impress on me that 
Malcev had already done nice things with (elementary) model-theoretic logic in 
group theory. The things I encountered myself happened to benefit from 
proof-theoretic logic. This will come up again later on in this article. 
2. An interlude: the fifties 
Myhill and I did not meet, but I read his papers. The terminology came from 
the foundational tradition with words like ‘cornerstone’ or ‘stumbling block’. I 
could not see for the life of me what was gained by presenting knowledge 
of -such a narrow area as-elementary recursion theory like a tree growing 
from a seed alias cornerstone. (When it came to degrees of r.e. sets, where this 
style might have required a new idea, Myhill did not use it anyway.) But his isofs 
enchanted me; not at all, as people say, for their own sake, but as follows. 
Dubious speculations about (Myhill’s) motives aside, that notion fits perfectly 
the assumptions that Cantor’s cardinals are the cat’s pyjamas, and recursive 
functions are God’s gift to Mankind. Then you replace (Cantor’s) arbitrary l-l 
maps by recursive maps, and see what you get: give those assumptions rope. 
In the fifties, with the successes of molecular biology, it was inevitable (for 
many of us) to think in terms of biological metaphors. Experience in biology had 
established the potential of making cultures, especially of bacteria (to learn about 
them, but also about other organisms, which may be more significant, but not so 
easily studied). Why not ideas? Philosophers may - be in duty bound to - worry 
about the fact that ideas are not localized in space and time. But here this is an 
advantage: the fact that cultures are so localized involves a lot of bother for 
experimenters. To cut a long story short, here was another market for logical 
experience. Of course, so to speak in principle, not only logical, but any other 
(mathematical) ideas have a similar potential. The question above asks whether 
this kind of use is, relatively, particularly rewarding in the case of logic. 
Perhaps an even more useful ingredient - in preparation for my conversations 
with Myhill (in the sixties)- was my education in the fifties, by Godel, 
concerning traditional foundational notions; as I saw them, quite independently 
of whether they are good, bad or indifferent; to be compared to cultures of 
bacteria that aid digestion, kill us off or do nothing in particular (to us). But I 
have told this story already; not only ad infinitum, but also ad nauseam. 
Idea(l) of logical closure 23 
Remark on a matter of temperament. The potential interest above of studying 
foundational notions - as parallels to bacterial cultures-was speculative; not to 
be forgotten, but not to be dwelled on either, until more was known through 
works of labour and of skill (preferably, by others). But the study had also an 
immediate use, which I for one found satisfaisant pour l’esprit: the correction of a 
wide-spread superstition in the professional literature. By far the most prominent 
objection there to logical foundations- in contrast, for example, to Dirac’s 
mentioned earlier- was an allegedly inherent lack of precision in traditional 
notions; with the tacit promise that miracles could be expected if ever they were 
to be made precise! This particular bogey could be laid to rest by-what I later 
called-informal rigour. Neither then nor now do I see any glaring difference 
between this enterprise and the precise formulations in rational mechanics of our 
idea(l)s how the world ‘should’ behave; including perfect liquids, in which I 
happened to be immersed after my undergraduate days. Some of these ideas 
turned out to have splendid mathematical properties, whether or not they were 
suitable for describing the phenomena for which they were intended. For all I 
know this may apply to currently popular string theory, too. 
The whole enterprise was great fun while it lasted; with lots of scope for irony 
in a world of highmindedness. It took me back to my mid teens, in my home 
town (Graz in Austria), where I heard from my betters that Schrodinger was 
recommending the Faustian spirit (to his students). I was enchanted by Faust. 
Mephistopheles seemed full of good sense, and Faust’s high-mindedness an 
absolute scream; not to speak of Wagner (though I know a lot, I want to know it 
all). For the record, it never occurred to me at the time - or at any time until the 
recent biography [lo] - that there were also affinities between Schrddinger and 
the Faustian flesh, which turned the comic beginning of Faust into the tragic end 
of Gretchen (whom Faust got in the family way; during a very short acquaintance 
to boot). 
3. Conversations with Myhill: the early sixties 
Brouwer’s ideas on-what he called-choice sequences were among the 
allegedly problematic notions of the foundational literature that had come my 
way around 1960; in the course of quite parochial mopping-up operations. 
Pedantically, ‘mopping-up’ when viewed by common sense, but -as so often in 
such cases-original for the logical tradition because they are in conflict with its 
heroic ideals. In particular, I had used (suitable) choice sequences for proving the 
completeness of certain fragments of intuitionistic logic without the ritual of 
setting out any - intended or concocted! - semantics; underlining thereby, as it 
were, the ritual character of the general idea of such semantics; to be compared 
(as I have always seen it) to the ritual of military exercises on crossing every 
possible kind of bridge, and forgetting that there may be none to cross or that the 
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water may be shallow enough at suitable spots anyway. Incidentally, if one is 
interested in actual reasoning capacities, the possibility of arriving at conclusive 
results without that ritual is not obviously less relevant than the possibility of 
concocting some coherent semantics. 
An even more parochial use at the time was for checking functional 
interpretations proposed by busy beavers for systems of classical analysis; too 
busy to check whether the proposals conflicted with Godel’s second incomplete- 
ness theorem (which provides splendid cross & checks, however dubious its 
high-minded interpretations are). Choice sequences become candidates for a 
check, whenever the functionals involved can be interpreted to operate on 
(suitable) choice sequences, and their particular properties used in a proposal are 
consequences of then-current principles for choice sequences. The proposal fails 
if those principles are formally proved consistent in the classical system 
considered. 
Banal as all this is abstractly, it was forgotten (by those busy beavers). But also 
it is in head-on conflict with foundational ideals, which - by what was said about 
our Cambridge days-had great appeal for Myhill. The conflict is obvious in the 
remarks above on the ritual of semantics; said not despite, but because of (my) 
familiarity with it. As to cross checks, by the stress on suitable choice sequences, 
their effectiveness depends on flexibility, liable to be spoilt by a premature 
restriction (in any foundational scheme). By general scientific experience, after a 
good deal of familiarity, relatively few schemes may be discovered to be effective 
in relatively many situations encountered. Of course, the two mopping-up 
operations are not claimed to exhaust the potential of choice sequences. But they 
were two principal items in the background to my conversations with Myhill, as 
follows. 
At the time he thought he wanted a change from his principal (logical) interests 
in the fifties, which had centred around Post’s ideas on r.e. sets and isols. (He 
told me I was joking when he heard my view of isols.‘) He wanted to give some 
attention to choice sequences, and I was his choice as a source of painless 
information; unlikely as this may have seemed he turned out to be right. I did 
what has always come naturally to me in such situations: I stressed points of 
difference. In particular, I went into the conflict, described above, between my 
own interests and the foundational ideal, but also reminded him of Kleene’s work 
on relations to recursion theory. Myhill had a thing about Kleene’s presentation, 
which has always seemed to me impeccable, provided it is read right. Roughly 
speaking, the reader should supply, usually quite simple, informal notions, for 
r Of course, I was joking roe. Many people pay lip service to the home truth that a joke can be an 
insight at the same time. (A joke is just one of many literary forms for expressing a thought, and I 
happen to find it congenial.) The only people I have met who, quite explicitly, saw a paradox in that 
home truth, in fact, in connection with specific jokes (of mine), were Wittgenstein and Godel. 
Admittedly, the most familiar (bureaucratic) kind of joke is good-natured, meant to distract from 
problematic aspects, and thus generally-in effect if not on purpose -stands in the way of 
approaching any remotely demanding insight. 
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which Kleene’s formal statements document that the formal notions considered 
share some familiar properties with the informal kind. At the time I interpreted 
this as an instance of a philosophical difference in Myhill’s and my views of 
understanding. My emphasis was on the fact that the author supplies the words 
and the reader the sense. His emphasis was on the fact that some words serve 
some readers better for this purpose. 
Be that as it may, these preliminary skirmishes did not discourage him from 
plying me with diverse questions about choice sequences. His words suited me 
very well; in particular, I could answer many of his questions. There was no 
pretence of collaboration, and thus no illusion about common aims, mutual 
understanding and similar paraphernalia. Naturally, relatively soon his stream of 
questions about sequences reached a point of diminishing returns, and he had the 
good sense not to ask me what I thought he should do with the answers (when he 
had no reason to suppose that he would be either able or willing to act 
accordingly). But he had other questions; about, to me, very familiar facts, to 
which I had given no attention at all. 
4. Soliloquies in Myhill’s presence 
For the record, at least in my experience such soliloquies are less deadly than 
pieces of writing that are soliloquies in the presence of a (dimly imagined) 
anonymous reader. But tastes differ. Generally, he set the agenda, usually by 
mentioning some aspect of my publications in the fifties that had caught his eye; 
as the business of isols earlier on had caught mine, but with a difference of 
emphasis. He simply assumed that there were ‘motives’ and ‘purposes’ of great 
inwardness, which with good will I must be able to confide to him; of unqualified 
interest to him and to the world at large. 
We were both disappointed; I by- what still seems to me-the height of 
vulgarity of his simple-minded (and correspondingly popular) ideas of cause and 
effect; here, in human affairs, but of course equally in the bulk of physical 
phenomena that strike the eye. Though no theory of chaotic dynamics was 
available at the time (for use as a metaphor), I had had enough experience during 
World War II of isolated instances in fluid motion to be duly impressed by the 
short-comings of those vulgar ideas; cf. the reminiscences in [18, pp. 139-1411. 
If anything, he was even more disappointed by the twist I gave to his agenda 
in - utterly relentless, to him desperately boring - soliloquies. One sample will 
do. It is chosen because it was the first he mentioned (and he returned to it on 
several occasions). 
My practice of reviewing struck him as odd; both the amount, and the kind. By 
prejudice (since I have not experimented with alternatives), in everyday affairs 
my spontaneous response to ‘Why?’ is ‘Why not?‘. For those with a sense of sin: 
to every sin of commission there is a sin of omission (and I do not have 
Wittgenstein’s gift for agonizing over such matters). Children have trouble 
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learning where to stop asking ‘Why?‘, and Aristotle relies on good breeding here; 
cf. Met I4, 1006a 6-9. (All this takes on a different look when particular aspects 
of an area have been discovered to lend themselves to theoretical understanding; 
in fact - this is a neglected point-of a suitable kind.) In any case, I had not had 
any occasion to give any thought to my reviewing practice. Left to myself I should 
simply not have been interested enough to do so. In Myhill’s presence I did; in 
ways that I found satisfying, as follows. 
Some easily described and easily checked uses I had made of those reviews 
came to mind; to be compared to what biologists do when it seems premature or 
otherwise unrewarding to look at the internal structure or at the biochemistry of 
some organ: they look at - what they call - its function(s). Since the mid-fifties I 
had been moving about a lot, which I have continued to do, and I used the 
reviews like personal notes. But while the latter would be easily mislaid or lost, 
the reviews were available in libraries all over the place. Before I was conscious 
of their use for this purpose, their ‘odd’ elements consisted mainly of alternative 
proofs for some results in the material reviewed or (new or old) complementary 
facts, with references to the literature. A familiar function of consciousness is to 
heighten fleeting impressions. Correspondingly, after Myhill had drawn my 
attention to the matter, other elements dominated in my reviews; for example, 
notes for using the logical literature like bacterial cultures. 
Probably, all this seems odder than the reviews themselves if they are assumed 
to serve some transcendental purpose. But there certainly was no practical 
problem: editors of review journals were free to give me guidance, and I was free 
to follow it or go elsewhere. This was not Myhill’s view at all.* 
With such philosophical differences it was a foregone conclusion that our 
regular meetings would reach a point of diminishing returns before long (which, 
for my temperament, is most agreeably located by going beyond it; other 
temperaments are different). It came about in a- for me at the time, and for him 
perhaps in retrospect -very satisfactory way. The phenomenon is familiar, 
probably described somewhere by Proust, but I do not know a suitable reference. 
My undergraduate days are very vivid to me (and very agreeable to 
remember), but only when associated with some real things; for example, when I 
happen to be at Cambridge or in the presence of a contemporary like Myhill, 
and, to a lesser extent, when writing about such people; cf. [18]. Consequently, 
left to myself I do not make what is probably the most rewarding use of past 
experience: for contrast with later experience. In my last few regular meetings 
with Myhill I droned on endlessly about the following simple point, which I 
continue to find central for a realistic view of potential uses for logic. 
Among my betters at Cambridge it was a matter of course (a tacit assumption I
’ Realistically, the business of oddity is a bit parochial. In the fifties a review (in mathematics) was 
not generally viewed as an excuse for an essay on the subject of the material under review (the current 
motto of the Bull. Amer. Math. SOL). But it would be really odd if the later view had not been 
(objectively) appropriate for some areas (of mathematics) even then. 
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either absorbed or else had before and consolidated) that current ‘difficult’ ideas 
should be clarified. G.H. Hardy used the idea of directproof in number theory, in 
other words, the idea(l) of purity of method applied to that subject: elementary 
logic is an excellent bargain for making this clear, at least, in the sense of 
‘precise’. Littlewood did not merely want to know where n(x) - h(x) first changes 
sign, but whether specific new ideas are needed to extract this information from 
his proof (that n(x) - ii(x) changes sign infinitely often). Here too logic is dandy. 
It may be abstractly amazing, but it is a fact of life that the most obvious 
alternative was not considered; neither explicitly nor implicitly. If clarity is really 
all you want, you can clear your head by ignoring those ideas (and see how you 
get on without them). Now, of course, only the most coarse-minded would ignore 
the premise. But if you do not, you had better face a problem: ‘What is lacking?’ if 
clarity is not all you want. (And do not expect to answer this question without 
extensive experience in the area considered.) 
Most people, with enough experience of these matters and the talent to act on 
it, especially those who went public, did not know how to say what they knew. 
They thus appeared ‘prejudiced against logic’, and it was child’s play to wipe the 
floor with them, rhetorically. It is harder to say what they did- and did 
not-know; not hard to tell them (if they want to know) by reference to their 
experience, but hard to tell others without producing the kind of illusion of 
understanding touched early on in this article. 
5. A subdued malaise; the last 30 years 
As in my brash quip to Dirac and Wittgenstein mentioned earlier, scepticism 
among thoughtful people about the most popular advertisements for logic has 
seemed to me, since my teens, perfectly well-founded; quite instinctively I 
measured opinions by weight, not mere number (and later I read Hume’s letter to 
his close friend Adam Smith, commiserating with the ‘approbation by the 
multitude’ - including ‘retainers of superstition’ ( = churchmen) - of The Theory 
of moral sentiments, Smith’s first book). After all, if the formal completeness of 
mere predicate logic and the incompleteness of, roughly, higher arithmetic are 
both presented as sensational facts of logic, for ordinary common sense there is 
something rotten in the state of that subject. It is then a matter of temperament 
whether one wants to stick one’s nose in nevertheless, but, at least for me, it does 
not present itself as a problem. However, in the mid-fifties I had found scepticism 
about elementary logic, as used in model theory, even among people who were in 
the market for logical clarification, especially of their own work. 
Remark. This scepticism was certainly not consciously related to those familiar 
straws of the logical tradition, at which academic philosophers tend to clutch; for 
example, quibbles about applying logical particles in the case of infinite domains. 
The people in question were interested in finite fields, too. 
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Obviously, like every opinion this scepticism had psychological aspects, which 
are most vivid to the mind’s eye (even if, in general, not to the same degree as in 
Myhill’s case). But I had a nagging feeling that I was missing some definitely 
interesting and probably even very simple other aspect of that scepticism. So 
much so that I tried to collect my wits in conventionally systematic lectures on 
model theory and in expository articles on other parts of logic, too. But whatever 
virtues they may have had, they did nothing for the particular malaise in 
question; in retrospect, not surprisingly, since, by experience with economic 
planning, systematic pursuits are liable to obscure particularly damaging 
oversights. 
A slick answer, which, incidentally, I should have been happy to hear in my 
teens (but nobody gave it). Like other branches of mathematics, elementary logic 
focuses on some class of objects (roughly, -what is called - ‘logical closure’ in 
the title3). But does this class have properties worth knowing? And what 
alternative classes are there, tacitly, for describing phenomena in roughly the 
same area of experience? In the area of statistics, where averages have a 
privileged place, the significance of classifications is a familiar principal concern. 
In everyday life there are questions about - the significance of - classifications 
of people by colour, table manners and other aspects that strike the eye (and are 
certainly precise enough by ordinary standards if not by Frege’s). In short, far 
from being baffling, the scepticism I encountered was mild: without logical 
experience one might wonder if logical closures were ever significant (classes). 
For one thing they are-advertised as being- defined in all possible worlds, 
which leaves wide open their significance for any particular aspect of our world. 
Corollary. From the start I viewed my malaise as metaphysical, not practical. If 
a commodity or sector of commerce-either of ideas or of material goods- is 
undervalued, it is liable to be overvalued in future when it surpasses (those 
modest) expectations. This happened to German and Japanese bonds, which 
Cambridge dons bought during World War II, when they were honoured after the 
war, and it happened to elementary model theory when it was used- as an 
ingredient -in work on Artin’s conjecture on zeros of polynomials in p-adic 
fields. It is a matter of temperament and resources whether one is comfortable 
dealing with such commodities (and with the people likely to be encountered in 
such sectors). So far, so good. 
But there is a price to pay: the murky side of the whole business of 
classifications, applications and all the rest in so-called lateral thinking (which 
involves relations to other things; here, of logical closure to, say, the rest of 
mathematics). If this business is viewed as a subject-to be understood-, it 
would be quite uncritical to assume that it is a subject for theoretical 
3 Below, ‘closure’ refers, first, to logical formation rules and then (in Section 7) to inference rules. 
In model-theoretic jargon the emphasis is on the formation of formulae F, in mathematical jargon of 
the abstract properties PF so defined. Thus when in model theory a structure is said to satisfy F, in 
ordinary mathematics it satisfies or, equivalently, has Pp 
Idea(l) of logical closure 29 
understanding, let alone according to familiar canons. Going back to the idea(l) 
of clarification in my Cambridge days (and exaggerating very little), such a 
subject would be the last place where clarity in any realistic sense could be 
expected; pace Wittgenstein, who dreamt of finding ‘clarity’ in ‘uses’. 
Manifesto. Not all-tacitly, rewarding-thought is theoretical. In particular, 
the literary tradition is not only, obviously, different, but often a genuine 
alternative for understanding a given phenomenon. 
As meant here that tradition is not determined by the words it uses, and so the 
literary forms of, say, mathematical logic are included (below). It is of course a 
separate question for particular readers, which traditions suit their own resources. 
One last introductory remark. Convention has it that, at this stage, I should 
apologize for having made a ‘personal’ selection (in what follows). In effect, if not 
on purpose, this is a smoke screen: the business is open ended, and all answers 
involve Some selection. My complaint about most conventional wisdom on this 
topic is that its most prominent selections are below the threshold for informed 
discussion. 
Keywords for the reminders in the next section come from elementary results 
about logical closure: quantifier elimination and universal elements, for example, 
for ‘auto-enumeration’. The themes include reasoning by analogy and letting 
ideas find their own level (or finding a cadre for them). 
6. Logical closure: potential markets 
By footnote 3 the general idea is familiar, but the emphasis is different, since 
the significance of the idea for other things is examined. Correspondingly, a 
couple of otherwise often negligible distinctions are worth remembering. 
First, the logical particles need not be viewed as operations, that is, functional 
relations, aka connectives; with the tacit understanding that they are, as it were, 
inevitably iterated to form the logical closure (of the primitives considered). In 
the literature, the symbol k has been used since Gentzen for the relation of 
implication, without commitment to any iteration, let alone, to the ideal of logical 
closure. 
Secondly, though propositions are, of course, relations without arguments, they 
will sometimes be distinguished; not under some general heading of ‘precision’, 
but simply because, in the situations encountered, different aspects are reward- 
ing; to be compared to distinguishing cabbages from kings in the- impeccably 
precise - union of both kinds of objects. 
The first observation is a formal counterpart to the refrain about the 
significance of logical closure, which affects of course the bulk of mathematical 
logic, and specifically the best known (early) unsolvability results since they apply 
to so-called elementary theories, which are logical closures. 
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The second observation comes up in a neglected difference between the 
well-known diagonal constructions, which show that there is no formula in a 
logical closure defining satisfaction and truth (of its formulae with, respectively, 
say one free variable and none).” Both observations are, as one says, ‘from 
within’ or ‘immanent’; in other words, congenial to the faithful. 
The samples below concern mainly relations between logical closure and areas 
of mathematics outside logic. Accordingly, the logical material below is very 
familiar, and readers can concentrate on problems (of significance) raised by 
those relations. 
(a) Logical aspects of identity: bargains and warnings. The facts used are 
familiar. First, the axioms 
x =Y 3 [A(x) 3 A(Y)] 
follow logically for all A in some logical closure from those for its basic A where 
all variables in ( * ), shown or not (parameters), are meant to be bound. 
Secondly, by means of the so-called elementary logical theory of = , that is, in 
terms of the logical closure of (the relation) = itself, only different finite domains 
can be distinguished. 
For a purist meaning of ‘identity’, (*) holds in practice, as one says, trivially 
since x = y is never satisfied; recall the warning of Heraclitus. If you can never 
step into the same river twice, what on earth can you do with - the idea of-the 
same (river)? One thing you can do, as noted by Leibniz, is to define it, that is, 
identity, in impeccable logical terms; along the lines of his ideal of validity in all 
possible worlds: quantify A in ( *) over all possible properties. 
For this world-or, pedantically, for its aspects, which have our (present) 
attention - ( * ) suggests a more rewarding variant to identity, familiar from a 
household word in contemporary mathematics: equivalence relation with respect 
to a suitably chosen bunch of properties A (tacitly, with parameters, in other 
words, relations). The familiar facts above, properly interpreted, provide both 
bargains and warnings. 
(i) Since an equivalence relation with respect to any bunch of given relations 
satisfies (* ) automatically for all A in their logical closure, that closure is here a 
significant class, for example, as follows. After having established that, say, 
operators F respect a particular equivalence relation E, mathematicians may want 
to know if some G respects E, too. Usually, they make a fresh start, without even 
thinking of simply checking whether G is in the logical closure of F. But also the 
following: 
(ii) By experience, for effective knowledge of many phenomena the discovery 
of suitable equivalence relations is decisive. So the fact that their (mere) logical 
theory does not distinguish between them, provides a formal counterpart to the 
4The case of satisfaction is a corollary of ‘straight’ nonenumerability of the predicates in a logical 
closure by one of its (binary) relations. The case of truth requires attention to the coding (of formulae 
without free variables) since there are just two (truth values of) propositions. 
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impression that logical aspects of equivalence are not significant here; in the 
vernacular: they are the least interesting side of the matter. 
At the same time, and by common consent, neglect of respect for the ambient 
equivalence relation can be disastrous; as a matter of experience, not mere 
possibility. 
Remark. Readers with broader interests, for example, in the perception or 
recognition of-what strikes the (mind’s) eye as- identity and in the wetware 
involved, should stop here and reflect how reasonable it is that logical aspects of 
the particular matter contribute little! Logical experience is salutary if it is used, as 
in (ii), to underline the limitations of those aspects even within the narrow area of 
mathematics, where, by and large, logic is relatively most rewarding. In sloppy 
terms: though of course stated in mathematical terms, (i) and (ii) are not part of 
mathematics. They belong to its prolegomena (in erudite terms); in current 
(mathematical) jargon, they are foundational. 
The next sample is at an opposite extreme; not of general cultural, but of quite 
parochial significance. Corresponding background knowledge is needed for 
informed discussion; below, knowledge about various fields. 
(b) Quantifier elimination: new markets for works of labour and of skill, and a 
kind of reasoning by analogy.” The logical closures of interest here are-of 
course not arbitrary (pace Frege), but-based on sets of relations such that 
all existential formulae have quantifier-free equivalents. (* *) 
Evidently, for a given logical closure, (* *) may be sensitive to the-choice 
of-basis; for example, ( * * ) is satisfied automatically if equivalents to every 
element are added to the basis. Here, as in (* *), ‘equivalent’ is meant with 
respect to validity. For readers with suitable background the points just made set 
the agenda for focusing on significant logical closures (without necessarily 
defining them in advance), most obviously, on two items. First, the properties 
of-the objects defined by - quantifier-free formulae must be in demand (in our 
sector of the commerce of ideas) also for some other formulae in the logical 
closure. Secondly, the particular equivalence (* * ) must preserve those pro- 
perties even when extended to the logical closure. Obviously, this matter is 
obscured by the assumption that (mere) truth or validity ‘looks after the rest’, as 
if propositions had no other properties besides mere truth! In practice, this item 
needs particular attention in connection with, roughly speaking, computational 
properties. 
Remark on works of labour and of skill. Even when such works from parochial 
traditions outside logic are ingredients of ( * * ), the logical notions used in ( * * ) 
are needed to state this fact; occasionally, works of labour and skill in the logical 
tradition are needed to establish it. In the earliest examples, of real closed and 
algebraically closed fields, the theorems of Sturm and Bezout did the job; more 
5 Dbclaimer. Far from replacing need for background knowledge, without it the household words 
used here produce only the kind of illusion of understanding mentioned earlier. 
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logic is used in more recent examples of p-adic and finite fields (besides Hensel’s 
lemma and the Riemann hypothesis for function fields). 
So much for reminders about the familiar past. Some less familiar aspects come 
up in the following, quite recent use in [2] of quantifier elimination for finite 
fields; tacitly, with a suitable choice of basic relations. 
Cardinal@ properties. The particular commodity, for which a new market is to 
be established, is-the, by now, standard analogue to - Riemann’s hypothesis 
for function fields. For the present purpose it is the following cardinality property 
(of Lang-Weil) for absolutely irreducible projective varieties - defined by sets of 
equations- V taken over finite fields IF,, V being embedded in projective 
n-space, IFD”. Let #V(F,) be the cardinality of V fl P(F,). Then 
I#V(F,) - 4’1 s (d - l)(d - 2)qi-“* + c(n, j, d)qj-‘, 
where j is the dimension and d the degree of V, and c depends only on the 
parameters shown. For large q, this is a strikingly good estimate of #V(F,)/qj 
since l/G is small, and l/q all the more. 
Now, [2] concerns all sets (defined) in the logical closure of the usual field 
operations, and not only absolutely irreducible varieties. Thus a disjunction of 
estimates is obtained, which depends on logical classifications of the defining 
formula considered, and is patently optimal for those classifications. In particular, 
the algebraic-geometric class above (of absolute irreducibility) cuts across those 
classifications, and is thus liable to be at cross purposes. Put differently, in terms 
familiar from economics (or the reminder that less is- tacitly, sometimes - 
more) there is a question how, if at all, the passage to the logical closure has 
passed a point of diminishing returns. For further discussion a rough statement of 
the result will do. In particular, below neither the uniformity (familiar in model 
theory) with respect to extra free variables in defining formulae, q, nor the 
dependence of the analogues to degree and dimension (of V above) is considered 
below though explicit in [2]. 
Let Q, be a formula, in the logical closure considered, with n free variables, and 
#q([F,) be the cardinality of the set of vectors with elements in [F, satisfying q. 
Then, for some j E Jm and p E pV, 
I#@,) - pq’( < d,&-li2 + c&l. 
where pV is a suitable finite set of rationals and Ja a finite set of integers. 
The logical result is recent, and so it would be premature to be too precise 
about its potential. But I for one should certainly like to see a (familiar) property 
of finite fields which is unexpectedly first-order definable. Then I should hope to 
learn unexpected information about its cardinalities from the result of [2]. For the 
record I expect history will repeat itself. Some specialists on finite fields will make 
an imaginative conjecture, and somebody familiar with [2] will use it to settle the 
conjecture; recall the conjectures of Artin and Serre on p-adics, which gave focus 
to model theory (of p-adic fields). 
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Discussion: from parochial to more general matters. First of all, the literature 
of the last 60 and especially 3.5 years is full of information on corresponding 
questions concerning other work involving quantifier elimination; perhaps, most 
impressively in the area of p-adic fields [9]; more peripherally, in connection with 
sums of squares (in which I happened to have taken a personal interest for 
reasons which need not be elaborated here “). In the fifties logical formulations 
were very efficient for answering simple questions, for which there was a market, 
simply; both qualitative (model-theoretic) and more quantitative (proof- 
theoretic) results. They all took the form of disjunctions, one of the differences 
emphasized above between the general result of [2] and the case of absolutely 
irreducible varieties (but also of [9]). Work of Delzell, [3] and especially [4], 
shows not only how (other) disjunctions can be contracted but the significance of 
additional requirements on such contractions; keywords: continuity, piecewise 
rationality. Here logic did not help; neither the classical nor the intuitionistic kind 
(which specializes in continuity). 
Secondly, coming back to the theme of quantifier elimination providing new 
markets (for works of labour and skill), the single most disturbing obstacle for a 
sensible perspective is to forget the competition from ordinary mathematical 
practice, which lacks the flashy terminology of the logical tradition. For example, 
by use of general results in function theory, ingenious identities or inequalities 
about humble trigonometric functions have been used for spectacular results (for 
example, on the Riemann hypothesis for varieties). More modestly, when a 
function f on (0, 1) is discovered to coincide with a function F of a complex 
variable, information about f finds a new market in the complex plane (by 
analytic continuation). Of course, being logical, quantifier elimination has a 
potential market in all possible worlds. But there is a price to pay: the imagination 
needed to spot a lucrative market in the actual world. The erudite word for 
‘potential’ is: in-principle. 
Thirdly, and this is perhaps of wider (cultural) interest-there is a similarly 
noteworthy difference between the logical and mathematical traditions when it 
comes to reasoning by analogy; for example, in the logical literature on so-called 
complete systems of axioms (and quantifier elimination establishes often, certainly 
not always, such completeness); ‘so-called’ because, tacitly, completeness with 
respect to a restricted class of properties, here, in some logical closure, is meant. 
For complete systems, knowledge - about the properties in question - of one 
model can be transferred to any other; in short, all such models are analogous 
(for these properties; somewhat clumsily they are often said to be analogous for a 
restricted ‘language’ although the analogy applies to any other description of the 
6 Correction of a sloppy aside on proof-theoretic aspects of the Nullstellensatz; cf. [6, p. 1661. In 
contrast to [14, pp. 313-3201 with detailed material on sums of squares I never returned to this 
matter; but cf., for example, [15]. (Also in contrast to sums of squares there was no interest 
up-market in such aspects.) Looking back I see no evidence that logical formulations could have 
served here (even) as first steps towards such sharp results as [I, 51 and, quite recently, (12). 
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properties, too; moreover this fact is central for many uses). In contrast, at least 
by and large, the mathematical iterature is either wholly cavalier about the class 
of properties to which its analogies apply or so specific that one does not think of 
the transfer of knowledge involved as reasoning by analogy at all, as in the 
following. 
Samples. (i) For the mathematical tradition an isomorphism between two 
structures, say, S and S’ is among the most unproblematic analogies. Logicians, 
who realize this at all, go on to say that all properties of higher-order logic (of the 
same relational type as S and S’) are preserved; cf. also the digression below. 
Reminder from (a) above: similarly, mathematicians rarely make a point of 
stressing the class of properties preserved by equivalence relations. 
(ii) Hasse’s local/global principle concerns only solubility properties of 
diophantine equations; specifying classes for which local fields are analogous to 
global fields. By almost any measure of ‘potential markets’ this is puny compared 
to the (logical) ultrapower principle: any structure is analogous to any of its 
ultrapowers with respect to all first-order properties. But when it comes to 
scientifically lucrative markets, at least so far Hasse’s principle has proved to be 
the better bet. 
Remark for readers with broader interest; cf. the end of (a) above. The 
recognition or perception of both logical and mathematical analogies has of 
course other aspects that are more vivid to the mind’s eye than the differences 
stressed above (and their similarities: for example they both happen to be 
precise). Once again, logical aspects of conscious phenomena - are of course 
present, but are found to-contribute very little. Different temperaments react 
differently. Thus Frege made a cult of this independence of logic from 
psychology. Here it is viewed as a fact of life, for which there is a price to pay: 
one cannot expect to learn much from the logical aspects of the world about those 
that strike the-literal and the mind’s - eye most. 
Digression (for specialists) about properties shared by isomorphic structures in 
(i) above. 
Background. In the broad mathematical, in particular, not specifically, logical 
literature the nature of the elements in the domains used in axiomatic mathe- 
matics is said not to ‘matter’. This is a far cry from the most prominent kinds of 
set considered in logic; in other words, various ‘fat’ or ‘thin’ hierarchies generated 
from a unique empty set. As a moment’s thought shows, for the mathematical 
tradition another description of the properties involved presents itself (as an 
alternative to higher-order predicate logic). As usual, some suitable paraphrase is 
needed to link the descriptions formally; for example, by variants with so many 
different empty sets, aka atoms or individuals, that to every set there is a set of 
empty sets which has the same cardinal. One such paraphrase is in a letter of A. 
Levy (23-VII-1989) in terms familiar from the literature, where V is a hierarchy 
generated from one empty set 0. 
Suppose F : V H V satisfies F( (0, x)) = x for all x E V and F(y) = 0 otherwise. 
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Define x E* y as x E F(y). Then (V, E*) satisfies axioms of set theory usual in 
logic including foundation; with extensionality restricted to the form 
vX(vy#0)[Vz(zEX @ zey) + x=y]. 
In (V, E*), to every set there is a set of empty sets with the same cardinal, 
required; cf. also [13]. 
In terms of this variant, simply all set-theoretic properties are shared 
isomorphic structures. Here ends the digression. 
as 
bY 
Like the present section the next uses only quite elementary information about 
the general notion of logical closure, and considers its relation to (many) other 
specific things. Thus, neither section is self-contained, and both will mean (very!) 
different things to readers with different background. 
7. Logical closure: failures and a sample of alternatives 
As before the failures relate to the fact that, when results about logical closures 
are left to speak for themselves, what they are heard to say - may be loud and 
clear, but-is not compelling on second thoughts. This is not a matter of mere 
possibility, but of experience. Some standard samples, which have been my own 
favourites for over 15 years [7], are about the computational complexity of 
‘theories’, in other words, the logical closures of familiar structures; for example, 
Abelian groups, real closed fields, etc. Painstaking work, sometimes providing 
scope for recondite (and elsewhere rewarding) properties of those objects, has led 
to large bounds; often with quite a narrow gap between lower and upper bounds. 
This was then complemented by- sometimes no less ingenious- work on 
average bounds, but still for the logical closure. Correspondingly, refinements 
refer to subdivisions in logical terms, for example, the number of alternating 
quantifiers (in prenex normal forms); only rarely contrasted with results specific 
to the subjects considered, as if these were not even recognized as relevant 
alternatives ‘. 
There is a less highly publicized parallel for the sense of logical closure 
(alluded to in footnote 3), where inference rules, as opposed to formation rules 
for wff, are considered; in particular, the computational complexity of derivations 
and especially of transformations of derivations, for example, by normalization. 
‘Evidently, this practice has not contributed to effective computation. But for a broader view it 
seems of interest as a metaphysical analogue to anosagnosia, a mirror image of blind sight, a 
significant topic of current neuro-biology; cf. the chapter by Bisiach in (171. Specifically, after certain 
kinds of stroke the patients are blind, but do not recognize this. The subjective experience of sight 
remains vivid, despite their (constant) stumbling, knocking their heads against unperceived obstacles 
and other, literally, striking evidence. Moreover, they are not able to make use of help by outsiders, 
who draw attention to that evidence. 
Disclaimer. The analogy is meant for recognizing phenomena of metaphysical anosagnosia; not for 
their scientific study, let alone, for changing them. 
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The literature is conscientious about varying the axioms, for example, the passage 
from Zzl to ZA0, as a practical contribution to computation (and cute results 
about ZAO as evidence for this, as if computational interest were the only 
intellectual tickle in the world). The obvious alternative, which has been used 
successfully for over 40 years, is to focus on subclasses of derivations: classes, of 
derivations from given axioms, that cut uuoss conventional classifications; by 
length and, for example, by cut degree. A useful example has long been the focus 
on the end piece, starting with universal lemmas; naturally, with a separate focus 
on what, if anything, is to be learnt from (the neglected) proofs of such lemmas, 
most recently in [S, pp. 85-871. As is to be expected from general scientific 
experience when points of diminishing returns are reached, it is generally best to 
make a fresh start (rather than a reverential analysis of the past). 
Abstractly, this is banal enough: reverence for idea(l)s stands in the way of 
changing them (and, with luck, improving them if, as above, they have been 
spectacularly unsuccessful). But also, by above, this home truth has not been 
respected in the practice of contemporary logic. There are of course many 
illustrations. The one chosen below seems suitable for the present occasion. 
Shifts of emphasis: about and around truth definitions. The elementary facts go 
back to Tarski and Myhill [ll], where, for a sensible comparison, the introduction 
to [16] by Tarski and Vaught, and not Tarski’s numbing publication(s) in the 
thirties should be used. Their emphasis turns around the existence of truth 
definitions in particular or about the logical ideal of a universal ‘language’ in 
general. 
Reminder. Such a language is expected to be as omnipotent, in its own way, as 
the Almighty (according to Cusanus): so ‘expressive’ that it both can and cannot 
define its own truth. 
Evidently, this kind of stuff can be ignored when the emphasis is shifted to the 
topic of the present paper; in particular, to the scientific significance of logical 
closure and one of its (logical) alternatives, ,Xy; and thus away from the biblical 
emphasis by Tarski and Myhill. But since ‘significance’ can be, and is, (ab)used in 
much the same way as ‘truth’ ‘, this seems to me as good a place as any to say a 
word or two about that (ab)use; ‘to me’, in contrast to academic traditions: for 
the mathematical tradition it is a digression, and the philosophical tradition would 
require a treatise, not a word or two, on such a topic. 
Manifesto. In contrast to algebra with such words as ‘field’, traditionally logic 
has (cl)aimed to contribute to effective knowledge of the phenomena ordinarily 
labelled ‘language’; pedantically, facts about its logical aspects are offered as such 
contributions. Realistically speaking, - and without gushing about the mystery or 
‘The view taken here, which might be called a ‘philosophy’ (of course, in the non-academic sense), 
is that we know quite enough about both truth and significance to make-details about them 
unrewarding beyond a few ‘foundational’ reminders, and-at least generally the question ‘truth of 
what?’ and ‘significance for what?’ a suitable focus of research; cf. the manifesto below and specially 
Section 8 for more. 
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miracle of linguistic capacities- we simply have massive knowledge of those 
phenomena; ranging from the familiar kind to those found in the case of brain 
damage; massive albeit not primarily theoretical(ly interpreted). This knowledge 
becomes even wider if thoughts over and above languages are included. 
Obviously, some elementary properties of those logical aspects have to be 
remembered. But the assumption that further logical elaboration would 
contribute - rather than distract from more rewarding aspects - overlooks not 
only this risk concerning effective knowledge of the phenomena in question, but 
also the logical risk: the tools used in establishing such elaborations are liable to 
be much more rewarding elsewhere, from which the focus on those familiar 
phenomena distracts. 
Reminder. There is at least one striking difference between the present topic of 
language and the singular successes in this century with the traditional emphasis 
(by Einstein); specifically, when material bodies (of positive rest mass) move near 
the speed of light or matter is dense enough to form black holes. In these cases 
precious little was known of other (more empirical) aspects. 
Corollaries. (a) With most shifts to different combinations, aka applications, of 
the logical aspects, also different properties of the latter reward attention; cf. 
degager les hypotheses utiles, tacitly, useful for the target envisaged. (b) 
Generally, what appeals to Simple Simons (a sizeable market) need not fit (a) at 
all. (c) Occasionally, it does, and thereby almost satisfies the famous ideal of 
Horace (Ars Poetica 343): mixing practicality, here, for effective knowledge, with 
pleasure, also to Simple Simons; delighting all, and instructing those capable of 
learning. 
Readers, who have talent and taste for reflecting on the questions under 
discussion at all, will have little difficulty in finding memorable examples in their 
experience of recursion theory. Obviously, (Myhill’s class) 2, comes up in 
connection with (Zy-definitions of) recursively enumerable sets and (Tarski’s) 
logical closure -pedantically, with respect to bounded quantifiers-with recur- 
sive sets. The word universal has found a proper meaning by reference to 
so-called complete sets; but not as a ‘limit to language’ (where the antics of strong 
artificial intelligence are reminders of the latter meaning). Other reminders of 
logical ideals-in fossils from the intellectual stone-age, or in live specimens of 
Simple Simons - are to be found in solemn debates: on whether recursiveness or 
recursive enumerability is most significant, tacitly, for some absolute order of 
priority, and in open-mouthed amazement at the mere existence of different 
descriptions (= definitions) of those two objects; as if not everything had 
(infinitely) many descriptions. Naturally, there can be no question of making up 
here in detail for all distractions produced by (gushing over) logical ideals. But 
perhaps the present occasion demands the following. 
Digressions. First, for the record there is my own failure to give proper 
attention to, let alone see any interest in, [ll] at the time (40 years ago). As usual 
in such circumstances there is too little information for sensible speculations 
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about cause and effect. But I remember clearly some passing thoughts at that 
time. On the one hand, [ll] emphasizes the contrast between _Zi and logical 
closure for the existence of truth definitions, not for classifications of scientific 
significance. The heavy weather that Tarski had made of that business was, to 
me, devoid of any sense of proportion: a philosophical mistake in the popular 
sense of this word (which overshadowed any philosophical errors in its academic 
sense which Tarski may have corrected). On the other hand, [ll] did not 
emphasize any relation to Kleene’s painstaking work on X:-enumerations of 
Z’$predicates (as opposed to Z?-sentences). Of course, I paid a price for being 
thus put off from taking a closer look at [ll], and its broader implications, in 
particular, the general question of significance. Myhill’s Z1 is an alternative to 
logical closure and adequate for the matter of truth definitions; with the implicit 
warning that other matters may be more demanding (and need nonlogical 
classifications). The second digression concerns the decade after [ll]. 
Myhill was fascinated by Post’s project of a pure mathematical theory of 2’: 
sets, including-what are now called - their Turing degrees. (At the time others 
used ‘degrees of constructivity’, with the implication of applying them as a 
measure of this commodity.) In terms used earlier on, Myhill thought of this 
branch of logic as a queen; within his mathematical experience, exceptionally 
decorative (as my favourite queens, among the few I have met, are); of course, 
not excluding the potential of being a handmaiden in suitable circumstances, too. 
My own interests here (in our conversations in the sixties), shared first by Spector 
and then by Sacks, came from another view of that queen, from above as it were: 
an interest in infinitistic versions. Of course, we all knew the fiasco of extending 
finite arithmetic to infinite cardinals and ordinals. Well, recursion theory is pretty 
different from arithmetic. Specifically, for more than a century, people have 
studied rational and algebraic dependence, alias reducibility, without introducing 
semilattices or what have you of rational ‘degrees’ among all algebraic numbers 
or algebraic ‘degrees’ among all complex numbers. Has number theory simply 
gone wrong by sticking to humble ‘measures’ of irrationality and transcendence 
(of prominent numbers) instead of looking for some lattice-theoretic ‘structure’? 
Or has, perhaps, recursion theory been a bit premature in focusing on its 
favourite structures (of all or at least all r.e. degrees)? 
For all I know I may have been too flippant altogether in the face of Myhill’s 
reverence. For one thing, to me, there was an air of unreality about it: he seemed 
genuinely unaware of any other queen! Presumably, some of us catch ourselves 
thinking that, even if we knew nothing but so-called lower arithmetic of perfect, 
amicable or submultiple numbers, we should have reservations about regarding 
this branch as a queen. But I for one am not sure (about myself) at all. For 
example, to this day I have no idea whether my spontaneous interest in models of 
open induction, probably recorded without any reservations in some review 25 
years ago, was (or, for that matter, is) an aberration of the sort considered. 
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The anecdotes above need not be viewed just as gossip; at least, by those who 
have experience with other queens. Looking back 30 years provides reminders of 
how easy it is to do ‘something’. Besides those infinitistic versions there were 
game-theoretic variants (and I myself toyed with axiomatic analysis in terms of 
logical complexity in the mid-sixties). 
In current jargon one has degree theory on well-founded, alias standard, 
segments of the ordinals and of set-theoretic hierarchies (and on nonstandard 
models of suitable fragments of arithmetic; for the record, fragments of theories 
of ordinals or sets, of course, here without axioms of infinity, still seem 
marginally better). In terms of the metaphor about bacterial cultures, remember- 
ing familiar cases - here, in the literature on lower and higher arithmetic (say, of 
elliptic curves) -could be salutary hygiene. More simply, it is harder to judge 
would-be queens reliably than handmaidens, and gushing only obscures this fact. 
8. Concluding remarks 
It is not half as tragic as it looks; tacitly, when seen in the light of academic 
disciplines. It is a common and high-minded assumption that all knowledge 
improves with their kind of discipline, but it is not necessarily so. We consider 
first logic in the sense it has acquired in the last 100 years in the academic 
discipline of mathematical logic, and then in its heroic sense of providing 
principles of reasoning. 
Academic, and more particularly mathematical and other theoretical, dis- 
ciplines deal in ideas that are rewarding subjects of research on their own; in 
particular, results of such (pure) research make them more effective tools of 
understanding. Not all (good) ideas are like this. The idea of the wheel is a 
tool - not only for engineering, but - for understanding broad mechanical 
phenomena: but not primarily by mathematical research on, say, recondite 
geometry of the 9-point circle. Far from being a by-product of general theory, a 
discovery of where, if anywhere, recondite geometry could be locally rewarding 
may be very demanding. After such a discovery the part of geometry concerned 
may benefit from academic discipline. Logic provides some parallels at both 
extremes, albeit at present modest compared to other (more recent) develop- 
ments in mathematics. By a refrain of this article the present state of affairs is 
viewed as a fair price for the logical ideal of generality. 
The principles of reasoning meant in the logical tradition vary with its 
branches. The most innocent include such things as ‘the logic of discovery’. Less 
crude versions are after principles of validity or, as a last resort, of meaning. But 
what is most dubious is what they all have in common, for example, the 
assumption that those phenomena of reasoning, which strike the eye, lend 
themselves at all to theoretical understanding; in terms of anything remotely like 
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logical aspects to boot. (One speaks even of the ‘priority’ of logic, though, for the 
purpose envisaged, there is no evidence of its adequacy a posteriori either ‘.) 
Given this view of the tradition, touched already in Section 5, it is probably 
again primarily a matter of temperament whether it is to be (ignored or) looked 
at, for example, when one feels helpless because it leaves one speechless. As 
always, encouragement can be found somewhere in the world’s literature, for 
example, in (part II of) A.E. Housman’s introduction to his edition of M. 
Manilii, Astronomicon Liber Primus. Incidentally, (the poet) Housman was a 
legend, as a classicist, at my college in the forties: “Zf a man will comprehend the 
richness and variety of the universe, and inspire his mind with a due measure of 
wonder and awe, he must contemplate the human intellect not only on its heights of 
genius but in the abysses of ineptitude; . . .” lo. 
Speaking for myself I am content with more down-to-earth understanding (than 
wonder and awe); cf. footnote 7. To repeat what cannot be repeated too often: 
the logical tradition is not a purely parochial matter, but a chemically pure 
specimen of a style of thought that is common below thresholds of informed 
discussion; ranging from topics that are obviously inaccessible with current 
means, as in footnote 9, to situations when people feel obliged to express a view 
without having any. Experience with the logical tradition -viewed critically, not 
merely gushed about -is, with luck, one source of immunity. 
More parochially, such experience can inspire the mind with a sense of 
proportion, apart from wonder and awe, in order to recognize contributions to 
knowledge by thoughts, including the logical variety, which are less flashy than 
would-be fundamental theory. 
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